Value neutrality and the ranking of opportunity sets
Garnett, Michael (2016) Value neutrality and the ranking of opportunity sets. Economics and Philosophy 32 (01), pp. 99-119. ISSN 0266-2671.
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Value Neutrality and the Ranking of Opportunity Sets [Final Draft 2].pdf - Author's Accepted Manuscript Download (252kB) | Preview |
Abstract
I defend the idea that a liberal commitment to value neutrality is best honoured by maintaining a pure cardinality component in our rankings of opportunity or liberty sets. I consider two challenges to this idea. The first holds that cardinality rankings are unnecessary for neutrality, because what is valuable about a set of liberties from a liberal point of view is not its size but rather its variety. The second holds that pure cardinality metrics are insufficient for neutrality, because liberties cannot be individuated into countable entities without presupposing some relevantly partisan evaluative perspective. I argue that a clear understanding of the liberal basis for valuing liberty shows the way to satisfying responses to both challenges.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Freedom, liberty, opportunity, liberalism, neutrality |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Michael Garnett |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Aug 2015 11:56 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:15 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/11791 |
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