Northcott, Robert (2016) A dilemma for the Doomsday Argument. Ratio 29 (3), pp. 268-282. ISSN 0034-0006.
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Abstract
I present a new case in which the Doomsday Argument (‘DA’) runs afoul of epistemic intuition much more strongly than before. This leads to a dilemma: in the new case either DA is committed to unacceptable counterintuitiveness and belief in miracles, or else it is irrelevant. I then explore under what conditions DA can escape this dilemma. The discussion turns on several issues that have not been much emphasised in previous work on DA: a concern that I label trumping; the degree of uncertainty about relevant probability estimates; and the exact sequence in which we integrate DA and empirical concerns. I conclude that only given a particular configuration of these factors might DA still be of interest.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is the peer reviewed version of the article, which has been published in final form at the link above. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Robert Northcott |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jun 2015 08:30 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:16 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/12284 |
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