Baratgin, J. and Douven, I. and Evans, J. St.B.T. and Oaksford, Mike and Over, D. and Politzer, G. (2015) The new paradigm and mental models. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (10), pp. 547-548. ISSN 1364-6613.
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Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Johnson–Laird and colleagues argue that mental models theory (MMT) can integrate logical and probabilistic reasoning [1]. We argue that Johnson-Laird and colleagues make a radical revision of MMT, but to ill effect. This can best be seen in what they say about truth and validity (Box 1). Formerly ([2], p. 651), in MMT p ∨ q (p or q) ‘... is true provided that at least one of its two disjuncts is true; otherwise, it is false.’ Thus p ∨ q is true provided that one of three possibilities is true: p & not-q, not-p & q, p & q. However, Johnson-Laird et al. claim, ‘The disjunction is true provided that each of these three cases [p & not-q, not-p & q, p & q] is possible.’ However, these three cases are always possible for jointly contingent statements: that is why they are rows of the truth table for p ∨ q. This new definition makes almost every disjunction true. An example of a disjunction that it does not make true is p ∨ not-p. This tautology fails to be true for their account because p & not-p is not possible.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Letter |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Oct 2015 09:26 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:18 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/12993 |
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