Oaksford, Mike (2013) Bayesian argumentation and the pragmatic approach: comment on Darmstadter. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4), pp. 495-499. ISSN 1354-6783.
Abstract
This paper is a comment on the recent criticism of the argumentative theory of reasoning that falsification is not always rational even in a group context because an isolated hypothesis can always be saved from refutation by adjustments elsewhere in the web of belief of which it is a part. It is argued that this insight is captured by the epistemic approach taken by Bayesian models of reasoning and argumentation. Consequently, a well-specified pragmatic account already exists which captures the interesting observations embodied in this critique.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Bayesian, argumentation, reasoning, pragmatic approach, web of belief |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
| Date Deposited: | 26 Nov 2015 11:39 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:20 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/13606 |
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