Usher, Marius and Tsetsos, Konstantinos and Yu, C.E. and Lagnado, D.A. (2013) Dynamics of decision-making: from evidence accumulation to preference and belief. Frontiers in Psychology 4 (758), ISSN 1664-1078.
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Abstract
Decision-making is a dynamic process that begins with the accumulation of evidence and ends with the adjustment of belief. Each step is itself subject to a number of dynamic processes, such as planning, information search and evaluation. Furthermore, choice behavior reveals a number of challenging patterns, such as order effects and contextual preference reversal. Research in this field has converged toward a standard computational framework for the process of evidence integration and belief updating, based on sequential sampling models, which under some conditions are equivalent to normative Bayesian theory (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). A variety of models have been developed within the sequential sampling framework that can account for accuracy, response-time distributional data, and the speed-accuracy trade-off (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Usher and Mcclelland, 2001; Brown and Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). Yet there are differences between these models with regard to the mechanism of decision-termination, the optimality of the decision and the temporal weighting of the evidence. There is also a need to extend this framework to preference type of decisions (where the criteria are up to the judge) and to enrich it so as to include control processes (such as exploration/exploitation), information search, and adaptation to the environment, thereby allowing it to capture richer decision problems; for example, when alternatives are not pre-defined, or when the decision-maker is not just accumulating evidence but also adapting beliefs about the data-generating process. This Research Topic presents new work that investigates the dynamical and mathematical properties of evidence integration and its neural mechanisms and extends this framework to more complex decisions, such as those that occur during risky choice, preference formation, and belief updating. We hope these articles will encourage researchers to explore the computational and normative aspects of the decision process and the observed deviations. We briefly review here the contributions in this collection, starting from simple perceptual decisions in which the information flow is externally controlled to more complex decisions, which allow the observer to control the information flow and other learning strategies, and following on with preference formation.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | This Document is Protected by copyright and was first published by Frontiers. All rights reserved. it is reproduced with permission. |
School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
Date Deposited: | 17 Dec 2015 16:19 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:20 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/13816 |
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