Huddleston, Andrew (2016) Normativity and the will to power: challenges for a Nietzsche constitutivism. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3), pp. 435-456. ISSN 0968-8005.
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Abstract
In this paper, I critically consider the Nietzschean version of constitutitivism that Paul Katsafanas has recently developed. My focus, following Katsafanas’s, is not on the exegetical issue of whether this constitutivism was indeed Nietzsche’s own view. It is rather on the philosophical question of whether the view itself is tenable. Do actions have a constitutive aim, in the way that Katsafanas supposes? If so, what is that aim? From the putative fact that actions have a constitutive aim, what would follow about the grounding of normativity in general? Will this approach yield up a tenable meta-ethical theory? While Nietzschean constitutivism is an ingenious and original position, it faces some serious challenges that it will have difficulty answering in a satisfactory way.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Copyright© 2016 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA |
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | normativity, agency, constitutivism, Katsafanas, will to power |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Andrew Huddleston |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jan 2017 10:55 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:20 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/13834 |
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