Reeves, Craig (2014) Criminal law and the autonomy assumption. Journal of Critical Realism 13 (4), pp. 339-367. ISSN 1476-7430.
Abstract
Book synopsis: This article considers and criticizes criminal law‘s assumption of the moral autonomy of individuals, showing how that view rests on questionable and obscure Kantian commitments about the self, and proposes a naturalistic alternative developed through a synthetic reading of Adorno‘s and Bhaskar‘s account of the subject in relation to nature and society. As an embodied, emergent, changing subject whose practically rational powers are emergent, polymorphous, and contingent, the subject‘s moral autonomy is dependent on the conditions for experiences of solidarity in four-planar nature. This view makes criminal theory‘s Autonomy Assumption look deeply questionable; autonomy must be a complex, nuanced open question, not an abstract, a priori default assumption.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | criminal law, criminal legal theory, critical legal theory, autonomy, subjectivity, need, responsibility, Adorno, Bhaskar |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Law School |
| Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Apr 2016 13:36 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:23 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/14996 |
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