A non-perpetual shirking model

Chen, Y.-F. and Zoega, Gylfi (2015) A non-perpetual shirking model. Economics Letters 134 , pp. 98-101. ISSN 0165-1765.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

Abstract

We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers’ effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.

Metadata

Item Type:	Article
Keyword(s) / Subject(s):	Wages, Shirking, Finite horizons, Retirement
School:	Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School
Research Centres and Institutes:	Applied Macroeconomics, Birkbeck Centre for
Depositing User:	Gylfi Zoega
Date Deposited:	25 May 2016 14:42
Last Modified:	02 Aug 2023 17:24
URI:	https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/15299

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