Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Mike (2006) A Bayesian approach to informal argument fallacies. Synthese 152 (2), pp. 207-236. ISSN 0039-7857.
Abstract
We examine in detail three classic reasoning fallacies, that is, supposedly ``incorrect'' forms of argument. These are the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument. In each case, the argument type is shown to match structurally arguments which are widely accepted. This suggests that it is not the form of the arguments as such that is problematic but rather something about the content of those examples with which they are typically justified. This leads to a Bayesian reanalysis of these classic argument forms and a reformulation of the conditions under which they do or do not constitute legitimate forms of argumentation.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
| Research Centres and Institutes: | Birkbeck Knowledge Lab |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Sep 2016 10:10 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:26 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/16106 |
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