Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Mike (2006) A normative theory of argument strength. Informal Logic 26 (1), pp. 1-22. ISSN 0824-2577.
Abstract
In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We also provide some evidence based on our recent work on the fallacies as to why Bayesian probability might, in fact, be able to supply such an account. In the remainder of the article we discuss the general characteristics that make a specifically Bayesian approach desirable, and critically evaluate putative flaws of Bayesian probability that have been raised in the argumentation literature.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Argumentation, fallacies, Bayesian probability, argument from ignorance, slippery slope arguments, circular arguments, Theophrastus rule |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
| Research Centres and Institutes: | Birkbeck Knowledge Lab |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Sep 2016 15:06 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:26 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/16152 |
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