Gemes, Ken (2009) Nietzsche on free will, autonomy and the sovereign individual. In: Gemes, Ken and May, S. (eds.) Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 33-50. ISBN 9780199231560.
Abstract
In some texts Nietzsche vehemently denies the possibility of free will; in others he seems positively to countenance its existence. This chapter distinguishes two different notions of free will. Agency free will is intrinsically tied to the question of agency; what constitutes an action as opposed to a mere doing. Deserts free will is intrinsically tied to the question of desert; of who does and does not merit punishment and reward. It is shown that we can render Nietzsche's prima facie conflicting assertions regarding free will compatible by interpreting him as rejecting deserts free will while accepting the possibility of agency free will. Nietzsche advances an original form of compatibilism that takes agency free will to be a rare achievement rather than a natural endowment.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | deserts free will, agency free will, responsibility, compatibilism |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Mar 2011 13:42 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 16:50 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/1651 |
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