Nikandrova, Arina and Steinbuks, J. (2017) Contracting for the second best in dysfunctional electricity markets. Journal of Regulatory Economics 51 (1), pp. 41-71. ISSN 0922-680X (Print) 1573-0468 (Online).
|
Text
jre_submission_rr_final.pdf - Author's Accepted Manuscript Download (530kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Power pools constitute a set of sometimes complex institutional arrangements for efficiency-enhancing coordination among power systems. In many developing countries, where such institutional arrangements can't be established over the short term, there still can be scope for voluntary electricity-sharing agreements among power systems. Using a particular type of efficient risk-sharing model with no commitment we demonstrate that second-best coordination improvements can be achieved with low to moderate risks of participants leaving the agreement. In the absence of an impartial market operator who can observe production fluctuations in connected power systems, establishing quasi-markets for trading excess electricity helps to achieve some cooperation in mutually beneficial electricity sharing.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | The final publication is available at Springer via the link above. |
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Electricity trade, Risk sharing arrangements, Self-enforcing contracts |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Arina Nikandrova |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Jan 2017 15:51 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:30 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/17873 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.
Archive Staff Only (login required)
