Nikandrova, Arina and Pancs, R. (2017) Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning. Journal of Economic Theory 171 , pp. 174-212. ISSN 0022-0531.
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Abstract
We consider a single-item, independent private value auction environment with two bidders: a leader, who knows his valuation, and a follower, who privately chooses how much to learn about his valuation. We show that, under some conditions, an ex-post efficient revenue-maximizing auction—which solicits bids sequentially—partially discloses the leader's bid to the follower, to influence his learning. The disclosure rule that emerges is novel; it may reveal to the follower only a pair of bids to which the leader's actual bid belongs. The identified disclosure rule, relative to the first-best, induces the follower to learn less when the leader's valuation is low and more when the leader's valuation is high.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Information disclosure, Conjugate disclosure, Bayesian persuasion |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Arina Nikandrova |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jun 2017 10:29 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:33 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/19020 |
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