Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, J., eds. (2018) Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198779681.
Abstract
Epistemic consequentialists maintain that epistemic norms are genuine norms when conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that beliefs should be reliably formed, based on evidence, consistent with one another, and so forth, because these things are conducive to the epistemic value of true belief. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to consequentialism in ethics. Recently, philosophers from both formal and traditional epistemology have shown interest in epistemic consequentialism. In formal epistemology, there has been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of decision theory where, instead of maximizing expected utility, one maximizes expected epistemic utility. In traditional epistemology, there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism about justification and whether such views are analogous to—and so face similar problems to—utilitarianism in ethics. This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics by defenders and critics of consequentialism alike. epistemic normativity, consequentialism, epistemic value, epistemic utility, reliabilism, formal epistemology, accuracy, rationality
Metadata
| Item Type: | Book |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Dec 2018 15:26 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:36 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20118 |
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