Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, J. (2017) Is reliabilism a form of consequentialism? American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2), pp. 183-194. ISSN 0003-0481.
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Abstract
Reliabilism — the view that a belief is justified iff it is produced by a reliable process — is often characterized as a form of consequentialism. Recently, critics of reliabilism have suggested that, since a form of consequentialism, reliabilism condones a variety of problematic trade-offs, involving cases where someone forms an epistemically deficient belief now that will lead her to more epistemic value later. In the present paper, we argue that the relevant argument against reliabilism fails because it equivocates. While there is a sense in which reliabilism is a kind of consequentialism, it is not of a kind on which we should expect problematic trade-offs.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Oct 2017 09:42 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Jun 2025 15:55 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20123 |
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