Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2014) Procedural justice and the problem of intellectual deference. Episteme 11 (4), pp. 423-442. ISSN 1742-3600.
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Abstract
It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady?s notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series of objections are considered and responded to.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Oct 2017 08:45 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Jun 2025 05:42 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20128 |
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