Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, J. (2014) A defence of Epistemic Consequentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257), pp. 541-551. ISSN 1467-9213.
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Abstract
Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a ?rejection? of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown that reliabilism—the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker?s main targets—survives Berker?s arguments unscathed.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is the peer reviewed version of the article, which has been published in final form at the link above. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | epistemic consequentialism, reliabilism, epistemic goods |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Oct 2017 08:30 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Jun 2025 20:30 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20129 |
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