Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) Meno and the Monist. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2), pp. 157-170. ISSN 1467-9973.
Abstract
Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato?s Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer scrutiny fully compatible with veritistic value monism. Consequently, contrary to what seems to be sup- posed in the literature, the critics of monism have little to gain from turning to the Meno for support.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Jan 2021 11:50 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:36 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20136 |
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