Lillehammer, Hallvard (2017) Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism. In: Machuca, D. (ed.) Moral Skepticism: New Essays. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory. New York, U.S.: Routledge. ISBN 9781138645868.
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Abstract
According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that are sometimes associated with moral skepticism. The first is the suspicion that in making moral claims we are merely projecting our attitudes onto the world. The second is the suspicion that in arguing for and against moral views we are merely attempting to influence each other to give similar answers to questions that have no determinate answer.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge. |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Hallvard Lillehammer |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Aug 2018 14:37 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:37 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20505 |
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