Hornsby, Jennifer (1993) Agency and causal explanation. In: Heil, J. and Mele, A. (eds.) Mental Causation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198239291.
Abstract
Book synopsis: Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behaviour have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature.
Metadata
Item Type: | Book Section |
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School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
Date Deposited: | 16 Jan 2018 11:39 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:38 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20868 |
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