Cowie, C. and Greenberg, Alexander (2018) Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In: Kyriacou, C. and McKenna, R. (eds.) Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 173-196. ISBN 9783319933696.
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Abstract
According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth. We ask whether there are persuasive arguments for the claim that belief stands in such a relation to truth. We examine and critique two arguments for this claim. The first is based on the transparency of belief. The second is based on Moore-paradoxical sentences. We develop a common objection to both. Both arguments are reliant on implausible claims about the relation between accepting a norm and being motivated by it. This point has sometimes been made in connection with the transparency of belief. But its development and application to Moore-paradoxical sentences are, we believe, novel.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published, version of record is available at the link above. |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Alexander Greenberg |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Jun 2019 11:15 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:40 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/21833 |
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