Grzankowski, Alex and Buchanan, R. (2019) Propositions on the cheap. Philosophical Studies 176 , pp. 3159-3178. ISSN 0031-8116.
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Abstract
According to the classical account, propositions are sui generis, abstract, intrinsically-representational entities and our cognitive attitudes, and the token states within us that realize those attitudes, represent as they do in virtue of their propositional objects. In light of a desire to explain how it could be that propositions represent, much of the recent literature on propositions has pressured various aspects of this account. In place of the classical account, revisionists have aimed to understand propositions in terms of more familiar entities such as facts, types of mental or linguistic acts, and even properties. But we think that the metaphysical story about propositions is much simpler than either the classical theorist or the revisionist would have you believe. In what follows, we argue that a proper understanding of the nature of our cognitive relations to propositions shows that the question of whether propositions themselves represent is, at best, a distraction. We will argue that once this distraction is removed, the possibility of a very pleasing, minimalist story of propositions emerges; a story that appeals only to assumptions that are (or, at least ought to be) shared by all theorists in the relevant debate.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | The final publication is available at Springer via the link above. |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Alex Grzankowski |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Nov 2018 16:06 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:45 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/24924 |
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