Northcott, Robert (2021) Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation. Synthese 198 , pp. 537-555. ISSN 0039-7857.
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Abstract
Pre-emption cases have been taken by almost everyone to imply the unviability of the simple counterfactual theory of causation. Yet there is ample motivation from scientific practice to endorse a simple version of the theory if we can. There is a way in which a simple counterfactual theory, at least if understood contrastively, can be supported even while acknowledging that intuition goes firmly against it in pre-emption cases – or rather, only in some of those cases. For I present several new pre-emption cases in which causal intuition does not go against the counterfactual theory, a fact that has been verified experimentally. I suggest an account of framing effects that can square the circle. Crucially, this account offers hope of theoretical salvation – but only to the counterfactual theory of causation, not to others. Again, there is (admittedly only preliminary) experimental support for this account.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | The final publication is available at Springer via the link above. |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Robert Northcott |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jan 2019 12:05 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Jun 2024 16:27 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/25250 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation. (deposited 22 Nov 2018 13:22)
- Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation. (deposited 09 Jan 2019 12:05) [Currently Displayed]
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