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    Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation

    Northcott, Robert (2021) Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation. Synthese 198 , pp. 537-555. ISSN 0039-7857.

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    Abstract

    Pre-emption cases have been taken by almost everyone to imply the unviability of the simple counterfactual theory of causation. Yet there is ample motivation from scientific practice to endorse a simple version of the theory if we can. There is a way in which a simple counterfactual theory, at least if understood contrastively, can be supported even while acknowledging that intuition goes firmly against it in pre-emption cases – or rather, only in some of those cases. For I present several new pre-emption cases in which causal intuition does not go against the counterfactual theory, a fact that has been verified experimentally. I suggest an account of framing effects that can square the circle. Crucially, this account offers hope of theoretical salvation – but only to the counterfactual theory of causation, not to others. Again, there is (admittedly only preliminary) experimental support for this account.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    Additional Information: The final publication is available at Springer via the link above.
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Robert Northcott
    Date Deposited: 09 Jan 2019 12:05
    Last Modified: 15 Jun 2021 19:31
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/25250

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