Steinberger, Florian (2019) Accuracy and epistemic conservatism. Analysis 79 (4), pp. 658-669. ISSN 0003-2638.
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Accuracy and epistemic conservatism Revised.pdf - Author's Accepted Manuscript Download (238kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: Norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind of epistemic conservatism---that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect to epistemic risk.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication following peer review. The version of record is available online at the link above. |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Florian Steinberger |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Dec 2018 15:43 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:47 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/25539 |
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