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    Uninformative equilibrium in uniform price auctions

    Daripa, Arup (2007) Uninformative equilibrium in uniform price auctions. Working Paper. Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK.

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    Abstract

    I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit commonvalue uniform-price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. I show that so long as there are some bidders who have a very high cost of information collection, even if there are a large number of other bidders who face an arbitrarily small cost of information collection, there are equilibria in which no bidder collects information.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Additional Information: BWPEF 1701
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Costly information acquisition, uniform price auction, uninformed bidders, uninformative equilibrium
    School: School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 26 Mar 2019 15:29
    Last Modified: 22 Jul 2020 05:56
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/26904

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