Price, Anthony W. (2008) Against requirements of rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1), pp. 157-176. ISSN 0066-7374.
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Abstract
Are inferences, theoretical and practical, subject to requirements of rationality? If so, are these of the form 'if … ought …' or 'ought … if …'? If the latter, how are we to understand the 'if'? It seems that, in all cases, we get unintuitive implications (often involving bootstrapping) if 'ought' connotes having reason. It is difficult to formulate such requirements, and obscure what they explain. There might also be a requirement forbidding self-contradiction (not that one's current beliefs can be consciously contradictory). It is a good question whether self-contradiction constitutes, or evidences, irrationality; but talk of a rational requirement causes trouble.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Nov 2010 14:02 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 16:53 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/2742 |
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