Dimitrakopoulos, Dionyssis G. and Passas, A.G. (2020) Reforming Greece’s tax administration during the financial crisis: the paradox of power asymmetry. South European Society and Politics 25 (1), pp. 27-48. ISSN 1360-8746 or 1743-9612.
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Abstract
This article examines the depoliticisation of Greece’s tax administration under the post-2010 bailout agreements in light of three alternative models of domestic change. It shows that one model (external incentives model that is based on power asymmetry) accounts for the direction of the reform but not how far the reform ended up going. There is little evidence in support of the second model (social learning) because of the absence of genuine programme ownership and evidence in support of the third model (lesson-drawing) is limited to the diagnosis of the problem. The final outcome was unintentionally shaped by key choices made by Greek governments in line with the literature on conditionality.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis, available online at the link above. |
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Administrative reform, conditionality, tax collection, IMF, bailout, depoliticisation, Greece, European Union, financial crisis, public debt crisis |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Social Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Apr 2020 09:18 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:59 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/31711 |
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