Navigating recalcitrant emotions

Grzankowski, Alex (2020) Navigating recalcitrant emotions. Journal of Philosophy 117 (9), pp. 501-519. ISSN 0022-362X.

Abstract

In discussions of the metaphysics and normativity of the emotions, it is commonplace to wheel out examples of (for instance) people who know that rollercoasters aren’t dangerous but who fear them anyway. Such cases are well known to have been troubling for Cognitivists who hold the emotions are (at least in part) judgements or beliefs. But more recently, the very theories that emerged from the failure of Cognitivism (Perceptual theories) have been argued to face trouble as well. Whereas Cognitivism predicts an untenable irrationality (contradictory beliefs), Perceptualism predicts that there is nothing wrong with cases of recalcitrance (nothing worse than believing the Müller-Lyer lines are the same in length despite appearing different). But there is something wrong – one should not be afraid of the rollercoaster deemed safe. So many theories appear to be threatened by recalcitrant emotions and there has been a call to find a way of making sense of “conflict without contradiction”. In the present paper I offer a new approach to making sense of the normative tension to which recalcitrant emotions give rise. Interestingly, the approach is one that can be adopted by anyone willing to grant that emotions are themselves governed by norms of appropriateness and it makes available some interesting diagnoses concerning the views that are threatened.

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