Competitive externalities in dynamic monopolies with stochastic demand
Beckert, Walter (2006) Competitive externalities in dynamic monopolies with stochastic demand. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 6 (1), ISSN 1935-1704.
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-598X.1330
Abstract
This paper analyzes equilibria in sequential take-it-or-leave-it sales when demand is stochastic. It is shown that equilibria in this sales mechanism, unlike in sequential auctions, trade-off allocative efficiency and competing buyers' opportunities to acquire an item to be sold, permitting prices and expected revenue above those of one-shot offers. Hence Coase-type conjectures are invalid in this setting.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Jun 2020 07:59 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:00 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/32102 |
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