Sciubba, Emanuela (2005) Asymmetric information and survival in financial markets. Economic Theory 25 (2), pp. 353-379. ISSN 0938-2259.
Abstract
In the evolutionary setting for a financial market developed by Blume and Easley (1992), we consider an infinitely repeated version of a model á la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) with asymmetrically informed traders. Informed traders observe the realisation of a payoff relevant signal before making their portfolio decisions. Uninformed traders do not have direct access to this kind of information, but can partially infer it from market prices. As a counterpart for their privileged information, informed traders pay a per period cost. As a result, information acquisition triggers a trade-off in our setting. We prove that, so long as information is costly, uninformed traders survive.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Jul 2020 16:50 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:01 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/32693 |
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