Sibert, Anne (2002) Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences. European Economic Review 46 (6), pp. 1093-1109. ISSN 0014-2921.
Abstract
This paper considers monetary policy when policy makers’ preferences are private information. I show that in the first period of a two-period term, all policy makers but the least inflation averse inflate less – but respond more to shocks – than if there were no private information. Moderately inflation-averse policy makers may reduce their inflation most. A tendency toward increased conservatism in their second period increases inflation in the first. With T<∞ period terms, inflation depends solely on the policy maker's time left in office. With unchanging preferences and no discounting, inflation is lower the longer he has left.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2020 06:46 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:01 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/32705 |
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