Perraudin, W. and Sibert, Anne (2000) The timing of multilateral lending. The Economic Journal 110 (460), pp. 192-211. ISSN 0013-0133.
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00496
Abstract
Bargaining over the terms of multilateral lending can be a prolonged process. We model failure to come to quick agreement as a screening device. Policy makers who find conditionality especially costly delay to signal their type. We show that increased costs to not reaching agreement, whether borne by borrowers or lenders, can increase the chances of delay.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2020 07:11 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:01 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/32707 |
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