Sibert, Anne (1999) Monetary integration and economic reform. The Economic Journal 109 (452), pp. 78-92. ISSN 0013-0133.
Abstract
Recent research in contract theory views ownership as a substitute for complete contracts. Here, this approach is applied to monetary integration. Countries face a coordination problem conducting monetary policy. Negative spillovers ensure uncoordinated policy generates too high inflation. Ex ante , policy makers can undertake politically costly economic reform. This has a positive spillover because it improves the outcome of the monetary policy game. Ex‐post contracting over policy may be possible, but it supposed that ex‐ante contracting over reform and monetary policy is not. This paper analyses when monetary union is a good substitute for this inability to commit.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2020 07:30 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:01 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/32709 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.
Archive Staff Only (login required)
