Sibert, Anne (1994) The allocation of seigniorage in a common currency area. Journal of International Economics 37 (1-2), pp. 111-122. ISSN 0022-1996.
Abstract
This paper considers the allocation of seigniorage in a common currency area with an independent central bank. It is shown that if the central bank retains autonomy in the allocation of seigniorage, inflation will be suboptimally high and taxes and government spending will be suboptimally low. Constitutionally mandating the rate of money growth will result in optimal inflation, but taxes and government spending will be too low. As long as consumers do not put too much weight on public good consumption, relative to private, it is better to constitutionally mandate seigniorage allocation shares than the level of money growth.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2020 09:17 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:01 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/32715 |
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