Booth, A.L. and Zoega, Gylfi (2001) Worker heterogeneity and general training. Working Paper. Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK.
Abstract
Worker heterogeneity can generate conditions under which firms will invest in the general training of their employees. A high ability worker raises the average level of talent in a firm and may consequently increase the range of tasks that can be performed within its ranks. In the absence of any countervailing worker power, some firms acquire monopsony power in the market for labour trained to do the more advanced tasks. Because the degree of monopsony power is increasing in task complexity, firms whose employees undertake more sophisticated tasks are more willing to finance general training. We conclude that training will take place in better-than-average or ‘good’ firms, while ‘bad’ firms will have low-ability workers unlikely to receive much training.
Metadata
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
Date Deposited: | 08 Dec 2020 16:01 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:06 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/42034 |
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