Oaksford, Mike and Chater, N. (2011) The "is-ought fallacy" fallacy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5), pp. 262-263. ISSN 0140-525X.
Abstract
Mere facts about how the world is cannot determine how we ought to think or behave. Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that this “is-ought fallacy” undercuts the use of rational analysis in explaining how people reason, by ourselves and with others. But this presumed application of the “is-ought” fallacy is itself fallacious. Rational analysis seeks to explain how people do reason, for example in laboratory experiments, not how they ought to reason. Thus, no ought is derived from an is; and rational analysis is unchallenged by E&E's arguments.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Nov 2011 12:43 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 16:56 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/4345 |
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