Coggon, J. and Kong, Camillia (2021) From best interest to better interests? Values, unwisdom, and objectivity in mental capacity law. Cambridge Law Journal 80 (2), pp. 245-273. ISSN 0008-1973.
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Abstract
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 governs personal decision-makingfor adults. It incorporates five overarching principles, including that incapacity may not be inferredmerelyfrom a person’s unwise decisions, andthat where a person lackscapacity decisions must be made in her best interests. Through analysis of judicial treatment of unwisdom, best interests, subjectivity, and objectivity, considered against Parliamentary debates on the Mental Capacity Bill and philosophical critique of ideas of (un)wisdom, we argue that these principles are problematically irreconcilable. The Act’s radical under-specificity means, paradoxically, that these come to be resolved through abstracted values, rather than the centricity of the person herself.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Social Sciences |
| Research Centres and Institutes: | Crime & Justice Policy Research, Institute for |
| Depositing User: | Camillia Kong |
| Date Deposited: | 31 Mar 2021 13:45 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:09 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/43683 |
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