Crane, T. and Grzankowski, Alex (2022) The significance of the many property problem. Phenomenology and Mind 2022 (22), pp. 170-175. ISSN 2280-7853.
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Abstract
One of the most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is that posed by Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’. Perhaps largely because of this objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence of the many property problem arises for all of the leading metaphysical theories of experience: all leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. Because of this, the many property problem isn’t on its own a good reason for rejecting Adverbialism; and nor is it a puzzle that will decide amongst the other leading theories.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | ISBN: 9791259931535 |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Alex Grzankowski |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Nov 2022 11:11 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:14 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/47071 |
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