Transatlantic divergencies in the regulation of uncertain risks: co-production, normative frames and ideal evidence-based and socially acceptable risk approaches

Leonelli, Giulia Claudia (2022) Transatlantic divergencies in the regulation of uncertain risks: co-production, normative frames and ideal evidence-based and socially acceptable risk approaches. German Law Journal 23 (5), pp. 769-799. ISSN 2071-8322.

Abstract

This article analyses the US and the EU systems of risk regulation through the lens of two ideal models: evidence-based and socially acceptable risk approaches. The examination is conducted against the backdrop of these ideal regulatory paradigms, which broadly inform US and EU risk governance. The article employs an analysis of transatlantic divergencies in the regulation of pesticides and agricultural biotechnologies to illustrate that neither approach can lay claim to neutrality and objectivity; non-scientific normative frames are always at stake in the field of risk regulation. Through these case studies, the article thus challenges the narrative that transatlantic divergencies result from a focus on “risks” or “hazards”, “science” or “politics”. The US and the EU systems reflect different approaches to scientific uncertainty, the pursuit of different levels of protection, and consideration of different non-scientific factors. They also have very different implications. The conclusive section of the article sketches out some final considerations on the strategic vision of the Biden administration. Environmental and public health protection are high on President Biden’s agenda; further, public interest litigation is thriving in the US. Will this be sufficient to break regulatory path dependency and lay the foundations for a paradigm shift in US risk governance?

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