Beckert, Walter and Siciliani, P. (2022) Protecting sticky consumers in essential markets. Review of Industrial Organization 61 , pp. 247-278. ISSN 0889-938X.
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Abstract
This paper studies regulatory policy interventions that are aimed at protecting sticky consumers who are exposed to the risk of being taken advantage of. We model heterogeneous consumer switching costs alongside asymmetric market shares. This setting encompasses many markets in which established firms are challenged by new entrants. We identify circumstances under which such interventions can be counterproductive: with regard to the stated consumer protection objective and also with regard to the complementary aim to promote competition.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | switching costs, price discrimination, uniform pricing, most-favoured customer clauses, price regulation, competition |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jul 2022 12:54 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Aug 2023 00:10 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/48806 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Protecting vulnerable consumers in "Switching Markets''. (deposited 03 Dec 2018 10:39)
- Protecting sticky consumers in essential markets. (deposited 25 Jul 2022 12:54) [Currently Displayed]
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