Grzankowski, Alex (2013) Non-Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 8 (12), pp. 1123-1137. ISSN 1747-9991.
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Abstract
Intentionality, or the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for things, remains central in the philosophy of mind. But the study of intentionality in the analytic tradition has been dominated by discussions of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, and visual perception. There are, however, intentional states that aren’t obviously propositional attitudes. For example, Indiana Jones fears snakes, Antony loves Cleopatra, and Jane hates the monster under her bed. The present paper explores such mental states in an introductory but opinionated way.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Alex Grzankowski |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Sep 2022 13:51 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:18 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/49233 |
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