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    Non-Propositional Attitudes

    Grzankowski, Alex (2013) Non-Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 8 (12), pp. 1123-1137. ISSN 1747-9991.

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    Intentionality, or the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for things, remains central in the philosophy of mind. But the study of intentionality in the analytic tradition has been dominated by discussions of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, and visual perception. There are, however, intentional states that aren’t obviously propositional attitudes. For example, Indiana Jones fears snakes, Antony loves Cleopatra, and Jane hates the monster under her bed. The present paper explores such mental states in an introductory but opinionated way.


    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Alex Grzankowski
    Date Deposited: 29 Sep 2022 13:51
    Last Modified: 29 Sep 2022 19:48


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