Meritocracy, public-sector pay and human capital accumulation
Chassamboulli, A. and Gomes, Pedro (2018) Meritocracy, public-sector pay and human capital accumulation. Working Paper. University of Cyprus Department of Economics..
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Abstract
We set up a model with search and matching frictions to understand the effects of employment and wage policies, as well as non-meritocratic hiring in the public sector, on unemployment, rent seeking and education decisions. Wages and employment of skilled and unskilled public-sector workers affect educational attainment; the extent of that effect depends on the structure of the labor market and how non-meritocratic public-sector hiring is. Conditional on inefficiently high public-sector wages, less-meritocratic hiring in the public sector lowers the unemployment rate and might raise welfare because it limits the size of queues for public-sector jobs. Public-sector wage and employment policies impose an endogenous constraint on the number of workers the government can hire through connections.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 08-2018 |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Mar 2023 11:19 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:20 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/50908 |
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