Lillehammer, Hallvard (2023) Could morality be a social construction? The Journal of Value Inquiry , ISSN 0022-5363.
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to identify and evaluate some of the most serious objections to the view that morality is a social construction. Among the objections considered are the claims that this view is incoherent; that it over-generates moral truths; that it under-generates moral truths; that it fails to capture the modal status of some moral truths; and that it fails to account for the phenomenology of moral experience. In each case, the objections are found wanting. During the course of the paper, the social constructivist view is critically compared with a range of other metaethical views, including moral realism and other forms of constructivism.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Metaethical Constructivism, Social Construction, Moral Relativism, Moral Realism |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Hallvard Lillehammer |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Jul 2023 15:29 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Aug 2024 00:10 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/51555 |
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