Besson, Corine (2010) Propositions, dispositions and logical knowledge. In: Longo, A. and Bonelli, M. (eds.) Quid est veritas? : hommage à Jonathan Barnes. Napoli, Italy: Edizioni Bibliopolis, pp. 233-268. ISBN 9788870885941.
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Abstract
This paper considers the question of what knowing a logical rule consists in. I defend the view that knowing a logical rule is having propositional knowledge. Many philosophers reject this view and argue for the alternative view that knowing a logical rule is, at least at the fundamental level, having a disposition to infer according to it. To motivate this dispositionalist view, its defenders often appeal to Carroll’s regress argument in ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’. I show that this dispositionalist view, and the regress that supposedly motivates it, operate with the wrong picture of what is involved in knowing a logical rule. In particular I show that it gives us the wrong picture of the relation between knowing a logical rule and actions of inferring according to it, as well as of the way in which knowing a logical rule might be a priori.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Corine Besson |
| Date Deposited: | 14 Oct 2013 10:21 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 16:58 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/5191 |
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