Mind and time: a local holism?

Jackson, Peter James (2023) Mind and time: a local holism? PhD thesis, Birkbeck, University of London.

Abstract

Let “Change” denote the movement in time of events from future to present to past. All versions of the A-theory of time consider Change (or a variation thereof) to be metaphysically real. Change being metaphysically real is, in terms of the A-theory, a primitive, mindindependent fact – something to be attributed just to the nature of time. But the B-theory of time considers Change to arise just with reference to an experiencing subject, being merely an apparent feature of an experiencing subject’s experience. In this thesis, I characterise this B-theoretic depiction of Change as Change obtaining relative to a “subjective temporal frame of reference”, this frame of reference being defined by the impermanent relations of futurity, presentness and pastness in which, in terms of the B-theory, events merely appear to stand to an experiencing subject. There are a number of important arguments which tell against the A-theorist’s account of mindindependent, metaphysically real Change. Whilst these arguments might not be unanswerable, many philosophers find them weighty and they do, I believe, serve to consolidate the B-theoretic position that Change arises just with reference to an experiencing subject. But this need not, I propose, mean that the B-theorist is right to claim that Change is invariably mere appearance and, as such, invariably of no metaphysical significance. Rather, I claim that, with reference to certain philosophically respectable accounts of experiencing subjects, Change being metaphysically significant is an essential prerequisite of an experiencing subject’s perceptual experience as such experience is characterised by these accounts. Equivalently, this is to claim that, with reference to these accounts of experiencing subjects, the posited subjective temporal frame of reference, and the relations of futurity, presentness and pastness which define it, are to be accorded metaphysical significance. With reference to other philosophically respectable accounts of experiencing subjects, however, this is not the case since, I claim, Change being metaphysically significant is not an essential prerequisite of perceptual experience as it is characterised by these other accounts. This therefore suggests that there is a connection between the topic of the experiencing subject, and the topic of Change. More generally, it indicates that the metaphysics of mind, and the metaphysics of time, are correlated. Indeed, my principal claim in this thesis is that mind and time are inter-defined, forming a local holism.

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