Deakin, S. and Konzelmann, Suzanne J. (2004) Learning from Enron. Corporate Governance: An International Review 12 (2), pp. 134-142. ISSN 1467-8683.
![[img]](https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text (Refereed)
Deakin_&_Konzelmann_2004.pdf - Published Version of Record Restricted to Repository staff only Download (75kB) |
Abstract
This paper argues that the Enron affair has been misunderstood as a failure of monitoring, with adverse consequences for the drafting of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Higgs report. Where Enron’s board failed was in misunderstanding the risks which were inherent in the company’s business plan and failing to implement an effective system of internal control. Enron demonstrates the limits of the monitoring board and points the way to a stewardship model in which the board takes responsibility for ensuring the sustainability of the company’s assets over time.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Enron, corporate governance, shareholder value, non-executive directors, monitoring board |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Research Centres and Institutes: | Responsible Business Centre |
| Depositing User: | Sue Konzelmann |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Jan 2013 11:04 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:01 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/5835 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.
Archive Staff Only (login required)
