Deakin, S. and Konzelmann, Suzanne J. (2003) Learning from Enron. Working Paper. ESRC Centre for Business Research, Cambridge, UK.
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Abstract
This essay argues that the Enron affair has been misunderstood as a failure of monitoring, with adverse consequences for the drafting of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Higgs report. Where Enron’s board failed was in underestimating the risks that were inherent in the company’s business plan and failing to implement an effective system of internal control. Enron demonstrates the limits of the monitoring board and points the way to a stewardship model in which the board takes responsibility for ensuring the sustainability of the company’s assets over time.
Metadata
Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Enron, corporate governance, shareholder value, internal control, non-executive directors, stewardship, monitoring board |
School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
Research Centres and Institutes: | Responsible Business Centre |
Depositing User: | Sue Konzelmann |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2013 11:44 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:01 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/5856 |
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