Corner, A. and Hahn, Ulrike (2009) Evaluating science arguments: evidence, uncertainty, and argument strength. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 15 (3), pp. 199-212. ISSN 1076-898X.
Abstract
Public debates about socioscientific issues are increasingly prevalent, but the public response to messages about, for example, climate change, does not always seem to match the seriousness of the problem identified by scientists. Is there anything unique about appeals based on scientific evidence—do people evaluate science and nonscience arguments differently? In an attempt to apply a systematic framework to people’s evaluation of science arguments, the authors draw on the Bayesian approach to informal argumentation. The Bayesian approach permits questions about how people evaluate science arguments to be posed and comparisons to be made between the evaluation of science and nonscience arguments. In an experiment involving three separate argument evaluation tasks, the authors investigated whether people’s evaluations of science and nonscience arguments differed in any meaningful way. Although some differences were observed in the relative strength of science and nonscience arguments, the evaluation of science arguments was determined by the same factors as nonscience arguments. Our results suggest that science communicators wishing to construct a successful appeal can make use of the Bayesian framework to distinguish strong and weak arguments.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
| Research Centres and Institutes: | Birkbeck Knowledge Lab |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 09 May 2013 09:15 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:03 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/6628 |
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